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Abstract: This paper examines the effect of independent director reputation incentives on corporate
social responsibility (CSR). Using an unbalanced panel of 3765 Chinese-listed firms between 2009 and
2014, this study suggests that independent director reputation incentives improve CSR. Furthermore,
it is found that this effect is more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) than in
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In addition, our results also show that the effect of independent
director reputation incentives on CSR is moderated by firm size, and this effect is much stronger in
relatively larger firms. Together, these results suggest that reputation is an effective mechanism that
can motivate independent directors to fulfill their role of monitoring and advising CSR, especially in
non-SOEs and relatively larger firms. We add new insights to the research on the topics of independent
director system, protection of the stakeholders’ interests, and CSR enhancement.
Keywords: independent director reputation incentives; corporate social responsibility; stakeholders’
interests; property ownership; firm size
1. Introduction
Recently, corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become a source of competitive advantages [1–4].
Therefore, a larger number of companies have an increasing interest in CSR and engage in various
CSR activities [5,6]. How to implement CSR is an important task for every firm.
Despite some definitions being used to describe CSR, there is no universal and exact definition for
CSR [7]. Carroll (1991) suggests that the word “social” in CSR is vague, and lacking in specific
direction as to whom the firm is responsible for [8]. Hence, companies can make their own
separate interpretations of CSR, and hardly implement real CSR. However, many studies make
explicit or implicit definitions about CSR from the stakeholders’ perspective. For example, Clarkson
(1995) specifies that corporate responsibility is in stakeholder groups instead of society as a whole,
and demonstrates that the definition of CSR can be better assessed by a stakeholder framework [9].
Wu et al. (2015) and Font et al. (2016) further suggest that firms should be responsible to their
stakeholders and satisfy or protect the interests of stakeholders to implement CSR [10,11]. Therefore,
CSR is described as a corporation’s obligation to all of its stakeholders in all its operations and activities,
which implies serving the stakeholders’ interests as a firm’s duty.
While implementing CSR, all stakeholders participating in an enterprise should obtain legitimate
benefits, and there is no prima facie priority of one set of interests and benefits over another.
However, recently, in many countries, a growing number of companies do not have relatively
better performance in CSR, and the stakeholders’ interests have been eroded, such as through
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environment pollution, encroaching on small and medium shareholders’ interests, tax evasion, etc.
Fernández-Gago et al. (2016) argue that independent directors can enhance CSR implementation and
protect the stakeholders’ interests [12]. Therefore, many countries have introduced an independent
director system as an institutionalized organizational design [13]. Regulatory authorities of these
countries expect that independent directors can effectively develop their function in safeguarding
the interests of stakeholders. However, in the existing literature, there is no agreement on whether
independent directors fully execute their duties and can impact on CSR as expected, and this debate is
ongoing. Wang et al. (2016) suggest that companies with more independent directors do not act better
in corporate governance than internal directors [14]. Chen et al. (2015) find that boards with a greater
proportion of independent directors improve the environment of accounting information and increase
the quality of financial reporting [15]. Liu et al. (2016) argue that independent directors’ attendance at
board meetings lessens the problem of tunneling [16]. Cavaco et al. (2017) find that independent
directors have an ambiguous impact on corporate performance. Therefore, the effectiveness of
independent directors in CSR remains unclear, and needs further investigation [17].
The main reason for the current disagreement on whether independent directors can play the
expected role is that what motivates independent directors to promote CSR is largely unknown.
Fama (1980) emphasizes the importance of strong reputation incentives for independent directors’
performance [18]. Good reputation not only increases independent directors’ influence in the companies
that they are employed, but also expands their career opportunities [19]. Masulis and Mobbs (2014)
document that independent director reputation incentives significantly affect independent directors’
board meeting attendance, their involvement in the board committees, and the likelihood of their
remaining on a firm’s board [20]. Therefore, reputation incentives play a significant role in independent
directors’ monitoring and advising behaviors. This means that independent director reputation
incentives can improve the company performance and firm value. In the past decades, researchers
have given particular attention to the effect of independent director reputation incentives. For example,
Sila et al. (2017) find that there is a positive link between independent director reputation incentives and
firm transparency [21]. Nevertheless, few studies examine the effect of independent director reputation
incentives on CSR. This study expects to fill this gap and contribute to the research on independent
director system, protection of the stakeholders’ interests, and CSR enhancement. We expect that
independent directors with strong reputation incentives can improve CSR based on the consideration
that the compensation mechanism for independent directors is underdeveloped, and the legal system is
weak in China. This is the focus of our study. In this study, we link the independent director reputation
incentives to CSR.
The Chinese market is well-suited for studying the link between independent director reputation
incentives and CSR for several reasons, as discussed below.
Firstly, in China, most of the independent directors hold multiple directorships. In 2009, nearly
three quarters of companies had appointed independent directors holding multiple directorships.
This relatively high percentage provides us with a unique dataset to discuss, since the number
of directorships that independent directors hold can signal an independent director’s ability and
reputation [22,23]. Ahn et al. (2010) suggest that independent directors that take more board seats
are more professional and enjoy a higher reputation in the independent director labor market [24].
Furthermore, multiple directorships offer higher compensation and greater opportunities for reputation
building. As a result, independent directors with multiple directorships can be motivated to perform
more effectively to maintain their reputation and gain more benefits. Therefore, the unique dataset
in China enables us to use the number of directorships held by independent directors as a proxy for
reputation incentives and investigate its effect.
Secondly, China market possesses characteristics unlike those of the developed markets in some
aspects of corporate governance, such as a highly concentrated ownership structure and a weak
stakeholders’ protection environment, providing the controlling shareholders with the opportunity
to pursue their own private benefits by tunneling. Over the past decades, tunneling has become
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a severe problem in China, and is greatly impairing other stakeholders’ interests. Wang et al. (2015)
find that most of the Chinese-listed companies perform worse in CSR [2]. To solve this problem,
in China, an independent director system has been introduced as a key component of corporate
governance reform for improving CSR and protecting stakeholders’ interests. In China, independent
directors are required to be firm outsiders and, therefore, are more objective and independent [25].
Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of Directors of Listed Companies,
published by the China Securities Regulatory Commission, states that independent directors should
issue independent opinions on corporate governance and have the duty to remain free from the
influence of major shareholders [26–28]. According to these statements, Chinese policymakers have
a high expectation that independent directors should be fully independent to protect other stakeholders’
interests expropriated by controlling shareholders [13,16]. Therefore, unlike the introduction of the
independent director system in the United States, which aims to solve the agency problem between
shareholders and managers, the independent director system in China has been viewed as a remedy
for the conflicts of interests between controlling shareholders and other stakeholders. However,
most existing studies about how to motivate independent directors’ role focus on developed markets.
These results may not be applicable to emerging markets. China market provides a unique opportunity
to study how to motivate the functioning of independent directors in emerging markets.
Thirdly, the unique context of China can enable us to recognize the different effects of
independent director reputation incentives on CSR when firms have different characteristics. China’s
unique property rights system divides listed companies into state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and
non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs). Firth et al. (2016) find that SOEs do not have the strong
incentive to appoint independent directors with rich expertise and good reputation compared with
non-SOEs [13]. This can reduce the role of independent directors in SOEs. Therefore, independent
director reputation incentives in SOEs and non-SOEs produce different effects. Meanwhile, the effect
of independent director reputation incentives may heavily depend upon independent directors’
effort distribution. Independent directors with strong reputations must devote time and energy
to improve CSR, in order to maintain and enhance their reputation. However, these independent
directors do not distribute their time and energy equally across all their directorships. In China, larger
companies can increase the likelihood of obtaining future directorships, offer independent directors
with the opportunities to enhance their reputation, and so on. It is evident that independent director’s
reputation rises with firm size. Masulis and Mobbs (2014) find that independent directors have stronger
incentives to monitor and advise in relatively larger firms, leading to more of a director’s time and
energy being captured in these firms [20]. In a word, given the limited time and energy independent
directors are able to devote to the firm, they tend to distribute their efforts among the companies
considering a firm’ relative contribution to their reputation. We further investigate the extent of the
association between independent director reputation incentives and CSR in firms of differing sizes.
In this paper, we examine the relationship between independent director reputation incentives
and CSR in China. Further analysis explores the moderating effects of property ownership and firm
size in this association. Our study finds the following results by using Ordinary Least Square (OLS)
regression. Our findings show that independent director reputation incentives can have an important
impact in protecting stakeholders and improving CSR. This effect is more pronounced in non-SOEs
than in SOEs, and is also much stronger in relatively larger firms. Together, these results provide
evidence that reputation is an effective mechanism that can motivate independent directors to fulfill
their role of monitoring and advising CSR, especially in non-SOEs and relatively larger firms.
This study makes some important contributions. Firstly, this paper provides new evidence on the
influence of independent director reputation incentives. Prior studies have found some factors that can
affect independent directors’ ability of protecting stakeholders, such as their social connections [29],
their personal characteristics [28,30], their compensations [31], and so on. Given the important of
reputation incentives, a growing number of studies have focused on the effect of independent director
reputation incentives over the past decades [21]. Yet, no studies have examined how independent
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director reputation incentives affect CSR. This study reveals the effective role of reputation as a strong
motivating force in enhancing an independent director’s monitoring and advising in CSR. Our results
deepen the understanding of the effect of independent director reputation incentives and, also, add to
the literature that researches this effect on firm outcome.
Secondly, this paper is the first to identify independent director reputation incentives as the
determinant of CSR implementation. Yet, to our knowledge, no exiting research focuses on this issue.
We find that independent directors with greater reputation incentives lead to better CSR. Our results
contribute to the literature on CSR and, specifically, to the literature on protecting the stakeholders.
This study can help inform further efforts to promote CSR practices in China.
In addition, to illustrate more clearly, we further examine the extent of the effect of independent
director reputation incentives on CSR in different scenarios for firms’ characteristics. Existing studies
focus on the effect of independent director reputation incentives without considering moderating
factors. This paper not only shows that independent director reputation incentives have an impact on
CSR, but also demonstrates that this effect differs in firms with different types of property ownership
and differing sizes, making unique contributions to the literature from a testing content perspective.
Finally, this paper is the first to study the effect of independent director reputation incentives in
the China’s context. To date, most studies on this topic have been conducted in the U.S. context [21],
but the extent to which these findings and their explanations hold in emerging countries has been
largely unexplored. The China market possesses characteristics similar to those of many emerging
markets. Hence, our results should be illuminating for emerging markets.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the institutional
background of independent director reputation incentives in China. Our hypotheses are developed in
Section 3. Section 4 describes our sample and our research design. Section 5 discusses the regression
results. Section 6 concludes this paper.
2. Institutional Background
Chinese-listed companies have a concentrated ownership structure, and they are plagued by
conflicts of interests between controlling shareholders and other stakeholders. This enables the
controlling shareholders to pursue their private benefits at the expense of other stakeholders by
tunneling [32]. Over the past decades, tunneling has become a severe problem in China, and can
hinder the effectiveness of corporate governance. Therefore, tunneling is the focus of current Chinese
corporate governance system [33,34].
In China, as most internal directors are appointed by controlling shareholders, they cannot
always be relied upon by other stakeholders to represent them when conflicts of interests between
controlling shareholders and other stakeholders arise [13]. Independent directors are more likely
to protect the stakeholders’ interests compared with internal directors, due to their objectivity and
independence [35]. Thus, to protect stakeholders is viewed as one of the most essential purposes that
Chinese policymakers hold in establishing an independent director system. Specially in 2001, the China
Securities Regulatory Commission published Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to
the Board of Directors of Listed Companies, which clearly states the independent directors’ rights
and duties on company operating. Specifically, independent directors are required to be concerned
with the interests of stakeholders and issue independent opinions on corporate governance. In the
statements, the China Securities Regulatory Commission rules that independent directors can hold
the positions of independent director in no more than five listed companies, and should pay special
attention to the legitimate rights and interests of stakeholders, and have a duty to remain free from the
influence of controlling shareholders.
Independent directors are appointed mainly to monitor and advise the firms they serve [36–40].
Reputation incentives could offer one explanation for why some independent directors are more
effective in their role [21]. Fama (1980) suggests that good reputation brings opportunities for additional
appointments to independent directors and increases their human capital [18]. Independent directors
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are rewarded more due to good reputation. Thus, independent directors are more concerned with
their public reputation in the independent director labor market [27]. Masulis and Mobbs (2014)
emphasize that reputation creates strong incentives for independent directors, and document that
reputation incentives positively affect the independent directors’ attention and effort devoted to
their directorships [20]. In a word, independent director reputation incentives have the effect on
corporate governance.
In China, there are mainly three incentive mechanisms to induce independent directors to monitor
and advise. These mechanisms are compensation mechanism, reputation mechanism, and legal
system. In terms of compensation mechanism, different firms offer the same compensation to different
independent directors [41]. This means that independent directors have no incentives to fulfill their
expected roles for higher compensation. In addition, the legal system is weak, and rarely employed to
discipline independent directors in China. Given the analysis above, these two mechanisms are not
the effective motivational vehicles for promoting independent directors’ function in China. Until now,
most of the independent directors in China are academics [42]. These academics often have good
personal ethical standards, and inculcate these standards into the companies they serve. In China,
Confucian culture greatly impacts people’s mindset, in which reputation and ethics are important for
a person, particularly for the people who are celebrities and work in the academic field. Therefore,
these independent directors pay more attention to their reputation than other directors. Moreover,
since reputation means a lot, as it directly affects an independent director’s value as perceived by
people, it has an impact on the likelihood of their obtaining future directorships. Especially, because
the independent director labor market is relatively underdeveloped in China, reputation is a vital
way to assess and select the independent directors, representing a valuable asset for independent
directors themselves. Independent directors have incentives to maintain and enhance their reputation
as effective monitors and advisors. Hence, the monitoring and advising of independent directors in
China have relied mainly on reputation incentives, rather than legal and compensation mechanisms.
For instance, Ma and Khanna (2016) suggest that reputational concerns motivate independent directors
to openly disagree with management strategies presented in corporate proposals [43]. Based on these,
we argue that preserving and enhancing reputation is a primary motivation for independent directors
in China, and further investigate the effect of independent director reputation incentives on CSR.
3. Hypothesis Development
The concentrated ownership enabled the controlling shareholders to expropriate other
stakeholders’ interests in China. Most internal directors and managers are appointed by controlling
shareholders, and may not protect other stakeholders’ interests. Compared with internal directors,
independent directors are more independent and objective, making them more likely to support other
stakeholders and improve CSR. Liu et al. (2016) further show that independent directors can preventing
the expropriation of other stakeholders by controlling shareholders effectively [16]. Independent
directors can not only monitor CSR implementation in the firm, but also provide relevant consultation
about CSR.
Reputation can be a valuable asset for independent directors [44], which not only sends
a positive signal to the market about their ability, expertise, and integrity, but also facilitates their
access to various resources [22,23]. Therefore, reputation is an effective incentive for independent
directors. Sila et al. (2017) emphasize the importance of strong reputation incentives in influencing
the independent directors’ behaviors [21]. Masulis and Mobbs (2014) report that director reputation
incentives significantly affect independent directors’ board meeting attendance, and their attention
and action in board committees [20]. Independent directors with a higher reputation tend to put more
effort and perform their duties more competently in the boards. In China, protecting the interests of
stakeholders and implementing CSR are important board duties, and independent directors mainly
represent the other stakeholders’ interests other than the controlling shareholders. Thus, our first
hypothesis is proposed as follows.
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Hypothesis 1. Independent director reputation incentives are positively related to CSR.
China’s unique property rights system divides listed companies into state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) and non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs). The state, which represents the largest
shareholder in SOEs, have more resources than private large shareholders in non-SOEs. Therefore,
SOEs have no incentive to hire the independent directors with high reputation to send the positive
signal in the market, legitimize firm business, and gain the resources support from the stakeholders.
Meanwhile, due to governmental intervention, even though those independent directors are hired,
their power is relatively weak, and it is difficult for them to exert their corresponding roles in SOEs.
This means that SOEs reduce the independent directors’ role in corporate governance. However,
non-SOEs have strong incentives to employ independent directors with a better reputation in order to
obtain more stakeholders’ support and recognition. Also, compared with non-SOEs, SOEs place more
emphasis on the maximization of social welfare than personal wealth. Liu et al. (2016) suggest that
the potential loss of political reputation and possible demotion due to poor performance discourages
management from colluding with large shareholders and aggressively expropriating other stakeholders
in SOEs [16]. Obviously, tunneling is more severe in non-SOEs than in SOEs. Hence, independent
directors in non-SOEs are concerned with more serious tunneling and solving it. This provides a better
chance for independent directors with a high reputation to fully play their monitoring and advertising
role in CSR. Given these, we predict that independent director reputation incentives promote better
CSR, with the effect being more pronounced in non-SOEs. Hence, we propose our second hypothesis
as follows.
Hypothesis 2. Independent director reputation incentives have more pronounced impact on CSR in non-SOEs
than in SOEs.
Independent directors with a strong reputation must devote time and energy to improve CSR.
However, because independent directors usually hold multiple directorships, they have limited
capacity and time, and are not able to function as effective monitors and advisors [45]. Independent
directors with multiple directorships face a dilemma of how to allocate their limited energy and time
across their directorships. This means that reputation incentives of independent directors are affected
by their effort distribution. More likely, independent directors do not give equal effort to all of their
boards. Independent directors tend to distribute their efforts among the firms considering a firm’s
relative contribution to their reputation. In China, larger companies offer independent directors
opportunities to enhance their reputation, increasing high likelihood of obtaining future directorships,
and so on. Hence, independent directors devote more time and energy to larger firms. Masulis and
Mobbs (2014) demonstrate that independent directors with multiple appointments show increased
board attendance and more board committee memberships at the relatively larger firms they serve [20].
This means that independent directors act more vigorously in relatively larger firms. Given these,
we argue that independent directors on multiple boards have stronger reputation incentives to monitor
and advise CSR in relatively larger firms. Our third hypothesis is proposed as follows.
Hypothesis 3. Independent director reputation incentives have a stronger effect on CSR in relatively
larger firms.
4. Materials and Methods
4.1. Sample Selection
We were able to obtain data about CSR from 2009 and onwards. Hence, our sample consists of
firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges during 2009–2014. This paper excludes
financial companies, because they have substantially different governance and performance systems
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compared with non-financial companies in China. Finally, after excluding observations with omitted
variables, a final sample with 3765 firm-year observations is obtained. CSR data is from CSR rating
report provided by Rankins CSR Ratings (RKS). We obtain all other data from the China Stock Market
and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database.
4.2. Research Methodology
In order to test our hypotheses, we estimate the following models using OLS regression.
Model 1.
CSR = β0 + β1 IDS + β2Size + β3SOE + β4ROA + β5LEV + β6ESHR + β7FSHR + β8Board + β9Out + β10Pay + β11DUAL + ε
Model 2.
CSR = β0 + β1 IDS + β2Size + β3 IDS × Size + β4SOE + β5ROA + β6LEV + β7ESHR + β8FSHR + β9Board + β10Out + β11Pay + β12DUAL + ε
In these two models, the dependent variable is corporate social responsibility (CSR), which is
measured by using the rating data of CSR provided by Rankins CSR Ratings (RKS), the leading
independent CSR-rating entity in China. RKS provides a score system for the different aspects of
CSR from stakeholders’ perspective. RKS data is composed of three parts: “Macrocosm”, “Content”,
and “Technique”. “Macrocosm” includes the overall strategy, governance, and information disclosure
in CSR reporting. “Content” has four principal dimensions: (1) “Economic Performance”, (2) “Labor
and Human Rights”, (3) “Consumption”, and (4) “Community Participation”. “Technique” relates to
the depth, coverage, and consistency of CSR reporting.
The explanatory variable is independent director reputation incentives (IDS). The existing
literature mainly uses firm size to measure this [13,22]. These studies find that reputation incentives
are related to firm size, and further show that independent directors will perform more vigorously
in relatively larger companies. However, firm size cannot reflect independent directors’ talents and
abilities. We argue that the number of directorships that independent directors hold can be a good
proxy of independent director reputation incentives for three reasons. Firstly, multiple directorships
can be an effective evaluation for independent directors’ value in China. Independent directors that
take more board seats are more valuable in the independent director labor market, which reflects
a higher demand for their services. Secondly, reputation, proxied by the number of directorships held
by the independent directors, can imply their ability and expertise, which raises their incentives to
exert effort and to be viewed as careful monitors and valuable board advisors. Thirdly, independent
directors in China are required to hold the directorships in no more than five listed companies, and they
only can work in one company continuously for six years. Meanwhile, the recruitment of independent
directors in Chinese market is based on reputation. Hence, independent directors have an incentive
to maintain and enhance their multiple directorships. Multiple directorships offer higher visibility,
greater opportunities for reputation building, and higher compensation. Independent directors with
more directorships may be more experienced, offer better monitoring service, provide better advice,
and make valuable contributions to board decision-making aimed at enhancing firm performance.
Therefore, multiple directorships can be a natural source of independent director reputation incentives.
We thus select the number of directorships held by independent directors as a proxy for independent
director reputation incentives, and find empirical evidence that independent directors with greater
reputation incentives lead to better CSR. Our measure is directorships per independent director, which is
the average number of board seats held by each independent director in a firm.
Moderating variables are firm size (Size) and property ownership (SOE). Previous studies have
focused on the effect of independent director reputation incentives without considering moderating
factors. The efficiency of independent directors in monitoring and advising CSR is influenced by
firm characteristics [28]. In China, property ownership and firm size are remarkable characteristics of
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a firm. Here, we further introduce property ownership and firm size as potential moderators of the
relationship between independent director reputation incentives and CSR. Size equals the logarithm of
a firm’s total assets. SOE equals 1 if a company is state owned, and 0 otherwise.
Extant studies argue that firm characteristics and board characteristics have an impact on CSR [45–50].
Following these studies, we include the control variables related to firm characteristics and board
characteristics. Variables about firm characteristics include corporate performance (ROA), leverage
ratio (LEV), managerial ownership (ESHR), and ownership structure (FSHR). ROA equals operating
profits divided by total assets. LEV equals total liabilities divided by total assets. ESHR is measured by
the percentage of shares held by the executives in the board. FSHR measures the shareholding ratio of
the largest shareholder. Variables about board characteristics include board size (Board), independent
director percentage (Out), independent directors’ compensation (Pay), and CEO duality (DUAL).
Board equals the total number of directors in the board. Out is the percentage of independent directors
in the board. Pay is measured by the logarithm of a firm’s independent directors’ compensation.
DUAL equals 1 if the chairman of the board and the CEO are the same person, and 0 otherwise.
Meanwhile, we control for the fixed effect of industry and year.
All variable definitions are shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Variable definitions.
Variable Definition
CSR Rating score of CSR from RKS
IDS The average number of directorships held by each independent director in a firm
Size The logarithm of a firm’s total assets
SOE If a company is state owned, SOE equals 1, and 0 otherwise
ROA Operating profits divided by total assets
LEV Total liabilities divided by total assets
ESHR The percentage of shares held by the executives in the board
FSHR The shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder
Board The total number of directors in the board
Out The percentage of independent directors in the board
Pay The logarithm of a firm’s independent directors’ compensation
DUAL If the chairman of the board and the CEO are the same person, DUAL equals 1,and 0 otherwise
5. Results
Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics of our sample. All variables are winsorized at 1% and
99% to reduce the influence of extreme values. In Table 2, the mean value of CSR is 34.343 and the
standard deviation is 10.693. This shows that there is a large gap in the performance of CSR among the
companies. Regarding the variable of IDS, the mean value is 2.012, and the standard deviation is 1.365,
which suggest that independent directors with multiple directorships in the listed companies have
become a common phenomenon in China. Regarding the variable of Out, the mean value is 0.338 and
the standard deviation is 0.049, indicating that the proportion of independent directors in every firm is
about one-third, basically in line with the relevant requirements of the law.
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics.
Variables Mean Median Max Min SD
CSR 34.343 31.698 73.146 17.069 10.693
IDS 2.012 1.920 3.333 1 1.365
SOE 0.213 0 1 0 0.391
ROA 0.046 0.039 0.123 −0.248 0.059
LEV 0.517 0.496 1.698 0.080 0.296
Size 20.369 18.521 25.823 20.098 1.212
ESHR 0.095 0 0.542 0 0.174
FSHR 0.364 0.357 0.648 0.142 0.132
Board 9.354 9 17 4 1.925
Out 0.338 0.333 0.5 0.3 0.049
Pay 9.981 10.412 12.54 8.695 0.654
DUAL 0.103 0 1 0 0.356
Table 3 presents the correlations between variables. To eliminate disparities among the variables,
we standardize all variables. Before conducting regression tests, multicollinearity is examined by
using Pearson analysis. In Table 3, we can see that CSR and IDS are significantly and positively related.
This result suggests that the reputation mechanism has the incentives effectiveness for independent
directors. The correlation coefficients between various explanatory variables are below 0.5, indicating
that there is no serious multicollinearity problem in the regression model.
Table 3. Correlation matrix.
Variables CSR IDS SOE ROA LEV Size ESHR FSHR Board Out Pay DUAL
CSR 1 0.23 *** −0.13 ** 0.21 *** 0.08 *** 0.15 *** 0.11 * 0.22 *** 0.31 0.15 0.07 −0.04
IDS 0.23 *** 1 −0.15 *** 0.03 ** −0.11 ** 0.02 *** 0.14 0.21 0.06 *** 0.14 ** 0.22 *** 0.11
SOE −0.13 ** −0.15 *** 1 0.09 −0.06 ** 0.18 *** 0.09 0.34 *** 0.08 0.11 0.07 0.14 ***
ROA 0.21 *** 0.03 ** 0.09 1 0.21 *** 0.31 *** 0.08 * 0.19 *** 0.16 *** 0.12 * 0.13 *** −0.07
LEV 0.08 *** −0.11 ** −0.06 ** 0.21 *** 1 0.22 *** 0.14 ** 0.11 ** 0.09 0.21 *** 0.06 *** −0.11 **
Size 0.15 ** 0.02 *** 0.18 *** 0.31 *** 0.22 *** 1 0.34 0.22 * 0.11 *** 0.16 *** 0.03 *** 0.16 **
ESHR 0.11 * 0.14 0.09 0.08 * 0.14 ** 0.34 1 0.18 0.11 * −0.01 0.04 0.07 ***
FSHR 0.22 *** 0.21 0.34 *** 0.19 *** 0.11 ** 0.22 * 0.18 1 0.25 ** −0.04 0.12 0.08*
Board 0.31 0.06 *** 0.08 0.16 *** 0.09 0.11 *** 0.11 * 0.25 ** 1 −0.22 *** 0.02 ** −0.12 ***
Out 0.15 0.14 ** 0.11 0.12 * 0.21 *** 0.16 *** −0.01 −0.04 −0.22 *** 1 0.03 0.11 ***
Pay 0.07 0.22 *** 0.07 0.13 *** 0.06 *** 0.03 *** 0.04 0.12 0.02 ** 0.03 1 0.03
DUAL −0.04 0.11 0.14 *** −0.07 −0.11 ** 0.16 ** 0.07 *** 0.08 * −0.12 *** 0.11 *** 0.03 1
***, **, * represent the significance level of 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively.
Table 4 reports OLS regression results with industry and year fixed effects. Column (1) presents
the result of the univariate test. The regression coefficient of IDS is 0.678, significant at the 1% level
in Column (1). In Column (2), we include some control variables related to firms’ characteristics,
such as Size, SOE, ROA, LEV, ESHR, and FSHR. The regression coefficient of IDS remains positive
and significant at the 1% level in Column (2). Finally, in Column (3), we further include a series of
control variables related to boards’ characteristics and find that the regression coefficient of IDS is 0.784,
still significant at the 1% level. Together, these results indicate that independent director reputation
incentives have a positive impact on CSR, which proves that the reputation mechanism can motivate
independent directors, effectively, to play the expected role in CSR, and supports hypothesis 1.
In Column (2) and (3), it is noted that SOE, ROA, LEV, and Size are significantly related to CSR.
This means that the characteristics of the companies have an impact on CSR. In addition, the regression
coefficients of ESHR and FSHR are significantly positive, suggesting that major shareholders and
managers are the main decision-makers in CSR. However, the regression coefficients of Board, Out,
and DUAL are not significant, implying that boards’ characteristics cannot affect their roles in protecting
stakeholders. Pay is not significantly associated with CSR. This result shows that compensation
mechanism cannot motivate independent directors’ performance in CSR.
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Table 4. Regression results.
(1) (2) (3)
CSR CSR CSR
Intercept 0.112 *** (3.892) 0.093 *** (2.901) 0.392 *** (2.986)
IDS 0.678 *** (4.143) 0.389 *** (3.561) 0.784 *** (2.951)
Size 0.891 *** (3.134) 0.052 *** (3.561)
SOE −0.008 *** (−3.501) −0.378 *** (−3.601)
ROA 0.109 ** (2.672) 0.892 ** (2.489)
LEV 0.093 * (2.231) 0.231 * (2.141)
ESHR 0.122 ** (2.035) 0.491 ** (2.491)
FSHR 0.419 ** (2.191) 0.081 *** (3.111)
Board 0.134 (1.872)
Out 0.281 (1.238)
Pay 0.892 (1.912)
DUAL −0.881 (−1.051)
IND/Year Control Control Control
Adjusted R2 0.256 0.423 0.492
F-value 11.032 *** 10.962 *** 12.298 ***
***, **, * represent the significance level of 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively.
In order to further explore the different effects of independent director reputation incentives
on CSR under different types of property ownership, we divide the sample into two groups, i.e.,
SOEs (SOE = 1) and non-SOEs (SOE = 0). Table 5 reports the regression results for the moderating
effect of property ownership. These results are based on OLS regression with industry and year fixed
effects. In Table 5, Column (1) presents the regression result using the subsample of SOEs and Column
(2) presents the regression result using the subsample of non-SOEs. The regression coefficient of IDS is
0.871 and not significant in Column (1). However, the regression coefficient of IDS is 0.613 in Column
(2), and is significant at the 1% level. We find a significant difference between the regression coefficients
of IDS in these two columns, suggesting that the effect of independent director reputation incentives
on CSR is more pronounced in non-SOEs than in SOEs. This finding is consistent with hypothesis
2. The possible reason could be that the independent director system for non-SOEs in China is more
market-oriented and standardized.
Table 5. Regression results (the moderating role of property ownership).
(1) (2)
CSR(SOE = 1) CSR(SOE = 0)
Intercept 0.123 *** (3.672) 0.076 * (2.111)
IDS 0.871 (1.472) 0.613 *** (3.672)
Size 0.567 *** (3.781) 0.823 *** (3.561)
ROA 0.451 *** (3.167) 0.729 *** (3.231)
LEV 0.356 * (2.271) 0.041 * (2.226)
ESHR 0.897 ** (2.071) 0.986 ** (2.631)
FSHR 0.203 *** (3.632) 0.912 *** (3.987)
Board 0.281 (1.761) 0.521 (1.771)
Out 0.022 (1.481) 0.461 (1.231)
Pay 0.323 (1.461) 0.980 (1.871)
DUAL −0.812 (−1.301) −0.899 (−1.113)
IND/Year Control Control
Adjusted R2 0.452 0.421
F-value 10.008 *** 11.635 ***
***, **, * represent the significance level of 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively.
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In addition, we argue that the relationship between independent director reputation incentives
and CSR can be moderated by firm size. Table 6 shows the regression results for the moderating effect
of firm size. These reported results are based on OLS regression with industry and year fixed effects.
In Column (1), the regression coefficient of IDS is 0.784, significant at the 1% level. As shown in Column
(2), the regression coefficient of IDS × Size is 0.881, significant at the 1% level. These results show
that firm size strengthens the effect of independent director reputation incentives on CSR, supporting
hypothesis 3. This further means that the effect of independent director reputation incentives in China
are affected by independent directors’ effort distribution. A possible explanation, as discussed earlier,
could be that independent directors distribute more energy and time to larger companies, due to the
attractiveness of these firms in terms of more future directorship opportunities, better reputation,
and various accessible resources.
Table 6. Regression results (the moderating role of firm size).
(1) (2)
CSR CSR
Intercept 0.392 *** (2.986) 0.145 *** (3.682)
IDS 0.784 *** (2.951) 0.476 *** (3.871)
Size 0.052 *** (3.561) 0.076 *** (3.901)
IDS×Size 0.881 *** (3.921)
SOE −0.378 *** (−3.601) −0.421 *** (−4.231)
ROA 0.892 ** (2.489) 0.782 ** (2.671)
LEV 0.231 * (2.141) 0.812 *** (3.821)
ESHR 0.491 ** (2.491) 0.623 ** (2.652)
FSHR 0.081 *** (3.111) 0.902 ** (2.901)
Board 0.134 (1.872) 0.562 (1.331)
Out 0.281 (1.238) 0.823 (1.301)
Pay 0.892 (1.912) 0.712 (1.792)
DUAL −0.881 (−1.051) −0.382 (−1.891)
IND/Year Control Control
Adjusted R2 0.592 0.601
F-value 12.298 *** 11.982 ***
***, **, *represent the significance level of 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively.
To avoid the possible effect of the endogeneity problem between independent director reputation
incentives and CSR, we use IDSt−1 to substitute for IDS. Regression results with IDS substituted by
IDSt−1 are presented in Table 7. A fixed effect model is applied due to the results of the Hausman test.
The results in Column (1), (2), and (3) show that the regression coefficients of IDSt−1 are significantly
positive, still supporting hypothesis 1. The regression coefficient of IDSt−1 is 0.691 and insignificant in
Column (4), but the regression coefficient of IDSt−1 in Column (5) is 0.325, significant at the 1% level.
Therefore, hypothesis 2 is, thus, still supported. Column (6) shows that the regression coefficient of
IDSt−1×Size is 0.612, significant at the 1% level, which still supports hypothesis 3. Hence, we conclude
that using IDSt−1 to substitute for IDS as the explanatory variable keeps our conclusions unchanged.
Further, an alternative measure of CSR, which is the comprehensive evaluation index of CSR
(CSRS), is used to substitute for CSR to test the robustness of our findings, as well as to further explore
the effect of independent director reputation incentives on CSR. CSRS can reflect the capabilities and
offerings of the firms to satisfy interest demands of stakeholders. This measure is calculated based
on the balance sheets, cash flow statements, and income statements. Table 8 reports the regression
results using CSRS as the dependent variable. A fixed effect model is applied due to the results of the
Hausman test. From the results in Columns (1), (2), and (3), we can see that regression coefficients of
IDS are positive and significant, still supporting hypothesis 1. In Column (4), the regression coefficient
of IDS is 0.433 and not significant, but the regression coefficient of IDS is 0.328 and significant at the
1% level in Column (5), supporting hypothesis 2. In Column (6), the regression coefficient of IDS×Size
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is 0.642 and significant at the 1% level, which still supports hypothesis 3. These findings do not change
our conclusions.
Table 7. Robustness check (IDS substituted by IDSt−1).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CSR CSR CSR CSR(SOE = 1) CSR(SOE = 0) CSR
Intercept 0.121 *** (4.091) 0.627 *** (3.891) 0.616 *** (3.401) 0.231 *** (3.881) 0.372 *** (4.212) 0.327 *** (3.221)
IDSt−1 0.982 *** (4.443) 0.313 *** (3.781) 0.431 *** (2.901) 0.691 (1.432) 0.325 *** (3.821) 0.562 *** (4.219)
Size 0.582 *** (3.601) 0.321 *** (3.601) 0.098 ** (2.532) 0.115 ** (2.601) 0.281 *** (3.632)
IDSt−1×Size 0.612 *** (4.431)
SOE −0.213 *(−2.080)
−0.456 ***
(−3.121) 0.391 *** (3.781)
ROA 0.092 ** (2.682) 0.524 ** (2.351) 0.829 *** (3.561) 0.722 *** (3.823) 0.612 *** (3.982)
LEV 0.341 *** (3.512) 0.699 * (2.271) 0.445 *** (3.921) 0.691 *** (4.231) 0.591 * (2.329)
ESHR 0.387 ** (2.561) 0.127 ** (2.522) 0.781 ** (2.622) 0.113 ** (2.791) 0.583 *** (4.321)
FSHR 0.096 ** (2.632) 0.092 *** (4.111) 0.087 *** (3.911) 0.382 *** (3.701) 0.521 *** (3.733)
Board 0.452 (1.911) 0.212 (1.291) 0.182 (1.432) 0.325 (1.695)
Out 0.411 (1.321) 0.511 (1.813) 0.344 (1.712) 0.112 (1.073)
Pay 0.773 (1.732) 0.301 (1.822) 0.541 (1.231) 0.278 (1.806)
DUAL −0.320 (−1.622) −0.098 (−1.391) −0.521 (−1.421) −0.302 (−1.754)
IND/Year Control Control Control Control Control Control
Adjusted R2 0.252 0.409 0.562 0.472 0.532 0.592
F-value 11.231 *** 14.920 *** 9.021 *** 1.082 *** 11.442 *** 13.901 ***
Hausman test 36.121 *** 34.861 *** 38.233 *** 58.928 *** 53.822 *** 59.892 ***
***, **, * represent the significance level of 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively.
Table 8. Robustness check (CSR is substituted by CSRS).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CSRS CSRS CSRS CSRS(SOE = 1) CSRS(SOE = 0) CSRS
Intercept 0.138 *** (3.673) 0.071 *** (4.032) 0.095 *** (3.723) 0.233 *** (3.482) 0.309 *** (3.897) 0.112 *** (3.433)
IDS 0.498 *** (3.562) 0.632 *** (4.031) 0.329 *** (3.633) 0.433 (1.923) 0.328 *** (4.523) 0.822 *** (3.622)
Size 0.012 *** (3.709) 0.062 *** (3.772) 0.038 * (2.153) 0.192 ** (2.711) 0.045 ** (2.572)
IDS×Size 0.642 *** (4.451)
SOE −0.698 **(−2.652)
−0.499 ***
(−3.893)
−0.482 ***
(3.729)
ROA 0.704 *** (4.412) 0.691 *** (3.122) 0.829 *** (3.991) 0.622 *** (3.911) 0.645 *** (4.212)
LEV 0.101 *** (3.349) 0.301 ** (2.498) 0.098 *** (3.623) 0.457 *** (3.938) 0.291 *** (3.532)
ESHR 0.088 *** (4.221) 0.091 ** (2.656) 0.133 * (2.201) 0.092 *** (4.342) 0.721 *** (3.154)
FSHR 0.518 ** (2.891) 0.354 *** (3.378) 0.431 *** (3.761) 0.356 *** (3.783) 0.533 *** (3.835)
Board 0.455 (1.783) 0.239 (1.239) 0.109 (1.789) 0.461 (1.371)
Out 0.477 (1.363) 0.323 (1.622) 0.664 (1.763) 0.209 (1.388)
Pay 0.508 (1.875) 0.221 (1.131) 0.339 (1.391) 0.692 (1.783)
DUAL −0.602 (−1.209) −0.336 (−1.442) −0.721 (−1.722) −0.383 (−1.575)
IND/Year Control Control Control Control Control Control
Adjusted R2 0.192 0.392 0.359 0.302 0.323 0.419
F value 9.892 *** 11.431 *** 10.341 *** 11.881 *** 13.591 *** 12.871 ***
Hausman test 41.932 *** 50.931 *** 54.213 *** 44.421 *** 41.342 *** 58.653 ***
***, **, * represent the significance level of 1%, 5%, 10%, respectively.
6. Conclusions
Understanding whether reputation creates strong incentives for independent directors to
effectively function in corporate governance is an important topic. In recent years, there has been
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a considerable increase in the studies in the literature concerning the effect of independent director
reputation incentives. However, few studies examine the link between independent director reputation
incentives and CSR. This is our focus. Therefore, we explore whether and how independent director
reputation incentives arising from multiple directorships affect CSR. Meanwhile, these prior studies
focus on the effect of independent director reputation incentives without considering moderating
factors. We further introduce property ownership and firm size as the potential moderators on the
relationship between independent director reputation incentives and CSR.
Using Chinese-listed companies in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange from 2009 to 2014,
this study shows that independent director reputation incentives can enhance CSR implementation,
and this effect is more pronounced in non-SOEs than in SOEs. In addition, we find that the effect of
independent director reputation incentives on CSR is moderated by firm size, and this effect is much
stronger in relatively larger firms. Together, we conclude that reputation is an effective mechanism
that can motivate independent directors to fulfill their role of monitoring and advising CSR, especially
in non-SOEs and relatively larger firms.
This paper has some theoretical and managerial implications. Theoretically, our findings show
that when we discuss how to motivate independent directors’ performance in CSR, it is necessary
to consider the reputation mechanism. Our paper shows that reputation incentives have a strong
influence on independent directors’ behaviors, and represent an important dimension of independent
director incentives. This study also provides some suggestions that may be of use to regulators
and policymakers, in their attempts to enhance independent directors’ performance effectively in
CSR. They can better prompt independent directors to fulfill their duties in CSR by establishing
an effective reputation mechanism. In fact, our results provide evidence for current requirements on
an independent director reputation incentives mechanism, and help inform further efforts to promote
CSR practices in China.
There are still some limitations in our study. On the one hand, this paper may be constrained
to a Chinese context and not be generalizable to non-Chinese markets. Future research with the
other markets’ data will enhance the external validity of our results. On the other hand, this study
examines the extent of the association between independent director reputation incentives and CSR,
only considering the moderating roles of property ownership and firm size. Future studies may
consider more other firms’ characteristics that can affect this relationship.
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